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Abstract
This paper addresses the impact of foreign ownership, government ownership, effi-
ciency and income diversification on the risk-taking behavior of banks in Indonesia. 
This research uses Z-Score to measure bank risk-taking behavior. Z-score proxies prob-
ability bank’s loss that is greater than its equity. Despite their profit, bank may suffer 
financial insolvency when taking too much risk. This study used a sample of 44 banks 
in Indonesia over the 2011–2016 period with purposive sampling method. Based on 
the result of the research, it can be concluded that foreign ownership can increase bank 
risk-taking behavior due to the barrier to entry in the form of deficiency of quality in-
formation of the borrower so that it has an impact on the increase of non-performing 
loan ratio. While government ownership can also increase risk-taking behavior, be-
cause banks are used by politicians to pursue political goals that cause banks to take 
high-risk projects with low profits. In addition, the results of this study also show that 
banks with low efficiency tend to increase the risk-taking behavior. 
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INTRODUCTION
The banking industry plays an important role in the economy as a fi-
nancial intermediary institution and payment system. Banks are still 
a major sector in driving the Indonesian economy; therefore, bank 
risk-taking behavior should be noted well by the banking regulator. 
Large banks with risk-taking behavior can increase systemic risk, 
causing disruption of the entire economic system. Bank risk-taking 
behavior can be measured using z-score. The z-score shows the prob-
ability of bank loss greater than the equity. Banks may experience in-
solvency when taking too much risk to make a profit. If the economy is 
in good condition, high risk-taking behavior will provide high returns 
as well. However, the bad economic condition can cause insolvency 
(Fang et al., 2014). 
There are various factors that influence bank risk-taking behavior such 
as bank ownership and bank characteristics. Previous studies (Berger 
et al., 2008; Shaban & James, 2014; Chen et al., 2017) generally divide 
bank ownership into domestic private, foreign, and state ownership. 
While the characteristics that affect bank risk-taking behavior are ef-
ficiency and income diversification. The penetration of foreign banks 
in Indonesia is increasing due to the high net interest margin and de-
regulation of foreign ownership (up to 99%) in the Indonesian bank-
ing industry. Foreign banks generally have advantages in accessing 
international capital, sophisticated management, and more advanced 
understanding of how to screen and monitor borrowers (Chen et al., 
2017). However, foreign banks face a barrier to entry in the form of 
a lack of creditor’s creditworthiness information, leading to a rise in 
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non-performing loans. The low quality of credit causes foreign banks to assume higher risk-taking be-
havior than domestic banks (Dell’Ariccia et al., 1999; Shirasu, 2017). The deregulation of private banks 
after PAKTO 88 caused the decrease of state bank domination. Differences in private and state own-
ership affect bank risk-taking behavior. State banks are generally used to pursue the political goals 
(Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). Bank risk-taking behavior is also influenced by the characteristics of bank 
efficiency. Generally, banks with low efficiency tend to improve their performance by lowering credit 
standards or reducing credit monitoring. In the short term, this policy indeed can provide high profits 
but may increase long-term risk. This risk-taking behavior may cause the bank to be insolvent if the ex-
ternal shock exists such as increasing of non-performing loans (Fiordelisi et al., 2011). 
This research composes four research problems, which are: 
1. Does foreign ownership affect bank risk-taking behavior? 
2. Does state ownership affect bank risk-taking behavior? 
3. Does bank efficiency affect bank risk-taking behavior? 
4. Does the bank income diversification affect bank risk-taking behavior?
1. LITERATURE REVIEW
1.1. Bank risk-taking behavior
It is well known that banks face various risks 
such as credit risk, liquidity risk, and another risk. 
Banks generally take risks to earn net income. 
Risks taken under normal economic conditions 
can provide a high profit. However, high risk-tak-
ing behavior while the economy is on the down-
turn may cause insolvency among banks (Fang et 
al., 2014). Laeven and Levine (2009) explained that 
insolvency occurs when the bank is unable to pay 
its liabilities. The situation occurs usually when 
bank losses are greater than equity. Thus, the 
greater liabilities value more often cause bank ex-
periencing insolvency. However, high risk-taking 
behavior causes the bank to face the uncertain-
ty of net income thus increasing the probability 
of insolvency. In many studies (Laeven & Levine, 
2009; Houston et al., 2010; Chen et al., 2017), bank 
risk-taking behavior is measured using an inverse 
of z-score that indicates the distance of a bank’s 
insolvency. The bank is insolvent if the z-score val-
ue falls below zero.
1.2. Foreign ownership
Banks with foreign ownership have several advan-
tages over domestic are through owning favora-
ble access to international capital, sophisticated 
management, and more advanced when dealing 
with borrowers. These three factors make foreign 
banks to have better risk control and lower bank 
risk-taking behavior (Chen et al., 2017). To over-
come the barrier to entry, foreign banks usually 
do mergers and acquisitions with domestic pri-
vate banks. Mergers and acquisitions can increase 
lending and increase profitability in the short term. 
However, the loan will accumulate the non-per-
forming loans in the long term, thereby reducing 
the profitability of foreign banks (Shirasu, 2017). 
This argument shows that mergers and acquisi-
tions only increase market share but are unable to 
solve the lack of information problem on borrow-
er’s eligibility. The high non-performing loans and 
the decline in profitability will have an impact on 
the low value of z-scores of foreign banks. The ar-
gument is supported by Angkinand and Wihlborg 
(2010), Lee and Hsieh (2014), and Chen et al. (2017) 
who analyze the influence of foreign ownership on 
bank risk-taking behavior. The results showed that 
foreign ownership positively affects bank risk-tak-
ing behavior.
H1: Foreign bank ownership positively affects 
bank risk-taking behavior.
1.3. State ownership
In general, most studies consider state owner-
ship to positively affect bank risk-taking behavior. 
State banks are usually used for political purpos-
es of distributing low-interest loans to groups that 
support politicians in return for having support-
ed political strategy. Under Agency Theory, the 
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separation of ownership between management 
and shareholders can lead to a conflict of inter-
est between management and bank shareholders. 
Domestic private bank shareholders concern with 
management that can generate profits. However, 
it is different from state banks that are managed 
by politicians. Politicians are considered to have 
strong corporate control rights but have no signif-
icant cash flow rights (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). 
This led to differences in banks with state banks 
dictated by political interests. Thus, politicians as 
owners of strong corporate control rights can en-
courage bank managers to lend to groups that sup-
port the politicians. 
In addition, the results of Micco et al. (2007) in 
developing countries showed that during the elec-
tion year, state banks provide larger loans with 
lower interest margins than private ownership. 
This causes banks to take high risks because of 
large credit expansion, if not offset by good credit 
quality, can cause loan problems in the future. The 
result is supported by Angkinand and Wihlborg 
(2010), Dong et al., (2014), and Chen et al., (2017) 
on the effect of ownership on bank risk-taking 
behavior. The results of this study showed that 
state ownership positively affects bank risk-taking 
behavior.
H2: State ownership positively affects bank  
risk-taking behavior.
1.4. Bank efficiency
Normally, banks with low-efficiency performance 
tend to have high risk-taking behavior due to vari-
ous causes such as poor management, moral hazard, 
short-term profit exchange with long-term risk, and 
unpreparedness against external shocks (Fiordelisi 
et al., 2011). Banks with low operating efficiency 
have a high burden due to an inefficient control of 
operating expenses. This encourages bank manag-
ers to execute moral hazard behavior due to the per-
formance indicators of bank managers.
Bank managers with moral hazard problems will 
try to increase short-term profits by loosening 
credit standards and loan monitoring. However, 
this means that banks have to bear the long-term 
risks of rising non-performing loans. This situ-
ation can encourage banks to experience insol-
vency in case of external shocks due to having 
bad credit or withdrawal of customer’s money. 
The argument is supported by Dong et al. (2014) 
and Chen et al. (2017) research on the effect of 
ownership on bank risk-taking behavior in de-
veloping countries using efficiency variables 
as characteristic variables. The results indicat-
ed that efficiency has a negative effect on bank 
risk-taking behavior.
H3: Bank efficiency negatively affects bank 
risk-taking behavior.
1.5. Bank income diversification
Conventional thinking among bankers, regula-
tors, and banking analysts argues that service 
income is more stable than interest income be-
cause service income is insensitive to interest rate 
movements and economic downturns. However, 
Deyoung and Roland (2001), and Stiroh (2004) 
argued that service income can increase risk 
through three causes. First, the income from 
lending activities is relatively more stable be-
cause there are switching costs and information 
costs that make it difficult for the debt holders 
to disconnect the loan, while the service activity 
is easier to move interbank consumers. Second, 
the loan activity has a variable cost of interest ex-
pense. While the activity of service income can 
have a fixed cost such as labor costs and will in-
crease the bank’s operating leverage. The high 
operating leverage leads to higher profit volatility. 
Third, the lack of regulations related to the cap-
ital structure and non-interest income may trig-
ger banks to arbitrate by transferring the risk of 
the on-balance sheet from interest-based activity 
to risk of the off-balance sheet from non-interest 
income based activities, which will increase the 
leverage of the bank. 
The argument is supported by Demirgüç-Kunt 
and Huizinga (2010), Beck et al. (2013), and Amidu 
and Wolfe (2013) study on the effect of income di-
versification on bank risk-taking behavior. The re-
sults of these studies showed that income diversi-
fication has a positive effect on bank risk-taking 
behavior.
H4: Bank income diversification negatively  
affects bank risk-taking behavior.
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2. METHODOLOGY
2.1. Data
This study used quantitative data, obtained from 
the annual report and bank financial statements 
over the 2011–2016 period. In addition, research-
ers used data from bank financial statements in 
2010 and 2009 to measure z-score that requires a 
previous two-year Return on Asset.
2.2. Research variable
The dependent variable in this research was the 
bank risk-taking behavior shown by natural 
z-score logarithm. This research uses Return on 
Asset (ROA) and Capital to Asset Ratio (CAR) as 
composite of ZSCORE to calculate the portion of 
bank’s value based on their risk, which is standard 
deviation of ROA. This study does not use Dupont 
analysis, because Dupont is a framework for ana-
lyzing fundamental performance and has not in-
cluded an element of risk. This ratio was measured 
using the following equation:
( ) ( )
ln .it it
it
it
ROA CARZSCORE
ROAσ
+
=  (1)
ROAit shows the company’s ability to use assets 
to generate a net profit, CARit is a capital to asset 
ratio that shows how much shareholders fund 
total assets, and ( )itROAσ  shows ROAit volatil-
ity. Beck et al. (2013) used three years of ROA to 
measure ROA standard deviation, because the val-
ue of Z-score has a big difference between banks. 
Thereby, researchers used the natural logarithm 
of Z-score to measure bank risk-taking behavior. 
Z-score is an inverse of bank risk-taking behavior. 
The smaller the Z-score ratio, the greater the bank 
risk-taking behavior.
In addition, there are independent variables of 
ownership and bank characteristics. The bank 
ownership consists of two variables: foreign own-
ership and state ownership. Both of these variables 
were measured with dummies. Dummy 1 (one) if 
the ownership of a foreign or government share 
exceeds 50% and 0 (zero) if the foreign or govern-
ment share is less than 50%. This research also 
used bank characteristic variables such as efficien-
cy and income diversification. Bank efficiency was 
measured with operation cost to operating income 
ratio, which shows the comparison between oper-
ating expense and operating income. Operation 
cost to operating income ratio is an inverse of 
bank’s efficiency. The greater operation cost to 
operating income ratio shows the bank has low ef-
ficiency. Meanwhile, income diversification was 
measured by non-traditional income ratio, which 
is the ratio of non-interest income to operating in-
come. The greater value of nontraditional income 
ratio shows greater diversification of revenues.
In estimating the influence of ownership and bank 
characteristics on bank risk-taking behavior, this 
research used ordinary least squares (OLS):
( ) 1
2 3 4
n
,
l  it it
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where ZSCOREit is an independent variable which 
is inverse from bank risk-taking behavior. There 
are two variables of bank ownership, namely 
FOREIGNit and STATEit, which show dummy var-
iable of foreign ownership (more than 50% foreign 
ownership equal to 1, and otherwise zero) and 
state ownership (more than 50% state ownership 
equal to 1, and zero otherwise). In addition, there 
are two variable bank characteristics in form of 
CIRit which show the inverse of efficiency (oper-
ational cost to operational revenue) and NTIRit 
used to measure the bank income diversification 
(non-interest revenue to operational revenue).
3. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
3.1. Description of statistics
Based on Table 1, it is known that the average val-
ue of bank risk-taking behavior as measured using 
natural Z-score logarithm (bank risk-taking) is 
4.047 with a standard deviation of 0.877. In addi-
tion, the Z-score has a wide range value, because 
the Z-score uses the standard deviation of ROA, 
causing the bank to have a very high Z-score value 
if it has constant ROA. 
This study uses two variables of bank ownership, 
namely foreign ownership and state ownership. In 
this study, there are 16 banks with foreign owner-
ship, 15 banks with state ownership, and 16 banks 
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with domestic private ownership with total firm’s 
year observation of 272. Efficiency measurement 
showed mean of 0.824 and income diversifica-
tion with mean of 0.110. The standard deviation 
of bank risk-taking behavior has the highest value 
than the other variables.
3.2. Model analysis  
and hypothesis testing
The research model has gone through testing clas-
sical assumptions to ensure that the research mod-
el is the best linear unbiased estimator (BLUE). 
The goodness of fit model (F test) is 3.063, which 
showed the model is statistically fit and inde-
pendent variables increase model fit. Linearity 
test showed that deviation from linearity is 0.539, 
which is higher than 0.05 or there is a linear re-
lationship between dependent and independent 
variables. The Adjusted R Square showed value of 
0.151 (15.1%) which explains that all independent 
variables can explain 15% of dependent variables 
movement. The results showed the effect of foreign 
ownership, state ownership, bank efficiency, and 
bank income diversification on bank risk-taking 
behavior (Table 2). 
Table 2. The impact of ownership and 
characteristics on bank risk-taking behavior
Variables Coefficient Sig.
Constant 6.425 0.000
Foreign ownership –0.335 0.007
State ownership –0.531 0.000
Efficiency –2.371 0.000
Income diversification –1.341 0.011
R 0.404
R square 0.163
Adj R square 0.151
Foreign ownership has a significant positive effect 
on bank risk-taking behavior as foreign banks 
face the problem of the creditworthiness of credi-
tor information when entering emerging markets 
such as Indonesia (Dell’Ariccia et al., 1999). As 
foreign banks enter the emerging markets, they 
will generally face the displacement of poor qual-
ity borrowers who are rejected by domestic banks. 
In addition, the lack of ability of foreign banks 
that recently entered the market in assessing bor-
rowers has led to foreign banks taking on substan-
tial credit risk in the future. Foreign banks gen-
erally enter the emerging markets by conducting 
mergers and acquisitions, so that credit risk can 
be reduced 
However, mergers and acquisitions only increase 
market share and cannot solve the problem of lack 
of information on borrower worthiness (Shirasu, 
2017). The results are consistent with Angkinand 
and Wihlborg (2010), Lee and Hsieh (2014), and 
Chen et al. (2017). State ownership has a signifi-
cant positive effect on bank risk-taking behavior 
as state-owned banks are usually used to pursue 
political goals by channeling low-interest loans to 
groups that support the politicians in return for 
supporting political strategies. Politicians gener-
ally have strong corporate control rights but do 
not have a significant cash flow right so one way 
to earn a profit is using state banks for political 
purposes (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). Because the 
loan is not based on a correct credit rating assess-
ment and having a low-interest margin causes the 
bank to take a greater risk. The results of this study 
are consistent with the results of Angkinand and 
Wihlborg (2010), Dong et al. (2014), and Chen et al. 
(2017).
Bank efficiency has a significant negative effect 
on bank risk-taking behavior, because low effi-
ciency indicates that banks have poor quality 
management in terms of operational cost control. 
This causes banks to suffer from low net income. 
However, low monitoring by bank owners and reg-
ulators will lead bank managers to carry out mor-
al hazards to create a high financial performance. 
The high financial performance is created by tak-
Table 1. Descriptive statistic
Variables N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. deviation
Bank risk-taking behavior 272 0.620 6.320 4.047 0.877
Foreign ownership 272 0 1 0.350 0.476
State ownership 272 0 1 0.310 0.461
Efficiency 272 0.391 1.567 0.824 0.146
Income diversification 272 0.003 0.457 0.110 0.099
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ing greater risks such as loosening standards and 
monitoring credit. While this can be successful 
in increasing profits in the short run but may in-
crease problem loans, causing banks to bear great-
er long-term risks. Coupled with the emergence of 
external shock events can encourage the bank to 
experience insolvency, because losses exceed the 
equity owned (Fiordelisi et al., 2011). The results 
are supported by the research by Dong et al. (2014) 
and Chen et al. (2017).
Bank income diversification has a significant pos-
itive effect on bank risk-taking behavior as inter-
est income from credit activity has a large switch-
ing cost and information cost. While non-interest 
income is easier to move between banks, the sit-
uation causes interest income more stable than 
non-interest income. Non-interest income also 
has the character of increasing the fixed expense; 
therefore, the uncertainty of non-interest income 
causes less stable operating profit of the compa-
ny. In addition, if the regulator does not specify 
a regulation related to the capital structure of the 
non-interest income activity, it may cause the bank 
to arbitrate by transferring the risk of on-balance 
sheet from interest-based activity to off-balance 
sheet risk. The action will increase the leverage of 
the bank (Deyoung & Roland, 2001). The result is 
supported by Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2010), 
Beck et al. (2013), and Amidu and Wolfe (2013).
CONCLUSION
This study aims to determine the effect of bank ownership and characteristics on bank risk-taking be-
havior in Indonesia. The research concluded that foreign ownership can increase bank risk-taking be-
havior due to the barrier to entry of banking industry. The barrier is usually in the form of deficiency 
of information quality of the borrower and has an impact on the increase of non-performing loan ratio. 
While state-owned banks can also increase risk-taking behavior because the banks are used by poli-
ticians to serve political goals and cause the banks to take high risk projects with insufficient profits. 
In addition, the results of this study also showed that banks with low efficiency tend to increase bank 
risk-taking behavior and take greater risks to improve short-term performance. While income diversifi-
cation can encourage greater bank risk-taking behavior because of the nature of the non-interest activity 
that easily transfers interbank consumers, increases fixed costs, and has high leverage if the activity is 
not funded by capital.
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